1.      In the attorney’s untimely “notice of removal” pleading, knowing was filed in the incorrect court. Besides being filed untimely, under 28 USC 1446 states: (a) Generally - A desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States and not into a United States District Court, PAWD, as shown by their pleading. See: "by making false, misleading, improper, or frivolous representations to the court." In re Taylor, No. 10-2154, slip op. at 15 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 2011) (quoting Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P'ship, 542 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2008)); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C 1927.

Title 28 USC 1446 states: (a) Generally - A desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States  states, in pertinent part: Section 1446 makes no mention of any “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.”  It only mentions a court known as a “district court of the United States.” 

The Supreme Court of the United States totally agrees with the concepts put forth above, as cited below: “The United States District Court is not a true United States court established under Article III of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein conveyed It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty granted under Article IV, 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to a people of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court.

Nor does the legislative recognition that federal constitutional questions may arise in litigation in Porto Rico have any weight in this discussion. The Constitution of the United States is in force in Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the sovereign power of that government is exerted. This has not only been admitted, but emphasized, by this court in all its authoritative expressions upon the issues arising in the Insular Cases, especially in the Downes v. Bidwell and the Door cases. Balzak v. People of Porto Rico, 258 US 298  (1922)

“The term District Courts of the United States, as used in the rules, without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance. It describes the constitutional courts created under Article III of the Constitution. Courts of the territories are legislative courts, and are not District Courts of the United States. We have often held that vesting a territorial with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the District Courts of the United States does not make it a ‘District Court of the United States.’ Reynolds v. U.S., 98 US 145, 154;  The City of Panama 101 US 453, 460;  In Re Mills, 135 US 263, 268;   McAlister v. U.S., 141 US 174, 182-183;  Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 US 445, 376-477;  Summers v. U.S., 231 US 92, 101;  U.S. v. Burroughs, 289 US 159, 163.

Not only did the promulgation order use the term District Courts of the United States in its historic and proper sense, but the omission of provision for the application of the rules to the territorial courts and other courts mentioned in the authorizing act clearly shows the limitation that was intended.” Mookini v. U.S., 303 US 201

The foregoing citations well-prove that any UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT does not constitute a “District court of the United States,” but rather constitutes only an Article IV court with possible jurisdiction only over territories and possessions belonging to the United States.