"The rule that wilful blindness is equivalent to knowledge is essential, and is found throughout the criminal law. It is, at the same time, an unstable rule, because judges are apt to forget its very limited sope. A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew. He suspected the fact; he realised its probability; but he refrained from obtaining the final confirmation because
he wanted in the event to be able to deny knowledge. This, and this alone, is wilful blindness. It requires in effect a finding that the defendant intended to cheat the administration of justice. Any wider definition would make the doctrine of wilful blindness indistinguishable from the civil doctrine of negligence in not obtaining knowledge." United States v. Jewell, 532 F. 2d 697 - Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 1976
"... true ignorance, no matter how unreasonable, cannot provide a basis for criminal liability when the statute requires knowledge." United States v. Jewell, 532 F. 2d 697
As Judge Feinberg said in United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1972), the purpose of the "deliberate ignorance" instruction is "to prevent an individual . . . from circumventing criminal sanctions merely by deliberately closing his eyes to the obvious risk that he is engaging in unlawful conduct."
We may presume "that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law," Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696-697 (1979), Quoted in Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 US 297 - 1983
Held: A municipality has no immunity from liability under § 1983 flowing from its constitutional violations, and may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense to such liability. Pp. 445 U. S. 635-658. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)
