In 1382, John Wycliffe translated the Holy Bible and wrote
“This Bible is for the Government of the People, by the People & for the People”.
The federal courts have repeatedly declared that:
‘it is citizenship that confers jurisdiction and not one’s domicile, inhabitancy or residence’.
- Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 US 61 (1809). “Neither residence nor inhabitancy is sufficient to give jurisdiction”.
- Haskell v. Bailey, 63 F. 873 (1894).
- Steigledger v. McQuesten, 198 U.S. 141 (1905)1,2 “prima facie
case of jurisdiction, depends on citizenship”
- Parker v. Overman, 59 U.S. 137 (1855) - "Citizenship" and "residence" are not synonymous terms’.
- Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646 (1878) – “It is the settled doctrine of this court that, in cases where the jurisdiction of the Federal courts depends upon the citizen ship of the parties, the
facts, essential to support that jurisdiction, must appear somewhere in the record.”
- Denny v. Pironi, 141 U.S. 121 (1891), “an averment of residence is not the equivalent of an averment of citizenship, and is insufficient to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction”3
- Grace v. American Central Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 283 (1883). Jurisdiction depends on citizenship.
- Sharon v. Hill, 26 F. 337 (1885) - “A party does not become a citizen of the state against his will”.
- Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) - “Nationality and citizenship are not synonymous
terms”.
- Steigledger v. McQuesten, 198 U.S. 141 (1905), “a mere averment of residence in a particular state is not an averment of citizenship in that state for the purposes of jurisdiction”. Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 137, 15 L. ed. 318; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 24 L. ed. 1057; Everhart v. Huntsville Female College, 120 U.S. 223 , 30 L. ed. 623, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555; Timmons v. Elyton Land Co. 139 U.S. 378,
35 L. ed. 195, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585; Denny v. Pironi, 141 U.S. 121, 123, 35 S. L. ed. 657, 658, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966; Wolfe v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. co. 148 U.S. 389, 37 L. ed. 493, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 602.
- Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), “The mere circumstance of birth within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, birth within a state does not establish citizenship
thereof”.
- “Persons claiming American citizenship merely by birth location may pay no allegiance to America”. 14 ex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 337, Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Spring 2008.
- U.S. v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328 (1919), “The United States, when it creates rights in individuals against itself, is under no obligation to provide a remedy
through the courts”.
- Ex parte Fung Sing, 6 F.2d 670 (1925), “Citizenship is a political status maybe defined and privilege limited by Congress”.
- ‘a domiciled citizen (U.S. or state) is under the bonds of allegiance to the country, he owes obedience to the civil laws (em) Fong Yue Ting v.
U.S., 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Baker v. Keck, 13 F.Supp. 486 (1936).
- The Court has “an independent obligation to determine
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010).
- “When jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the pleadings, to establish diversity, must set forth with specificity the citizenship of the parties.” Barclay Square Props. v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Minneapolis, 893 F.2d 968, 969 (8th Cir.
1990). Because they removed the action from state court, Defendants bear the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. See Altimore v. Mount Mercy Coll., 420 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2005).
- It is well established that citizenship and residence are not synonymous for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See: Dubach v. Weitzel, 135 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1998); Walker v. Norwest Corp., 108 F.3d 158, 161
(8th Cir. 1997); Dale v. Weller, 956 F.2d 813, 814-15 (8th Cir. 1992); Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987).
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a national bank “is a citizen of the State in which its main office, as set forth in its articles of association, is located.” Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 306-07 (2006); see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. WMR e-Pin, LLC, 653 F.3d 702, 709 (8th
Cir. 2011) (holding that a national bank whose principal place of business is in a state different from the state where its main office is located “is a citizen only of the state in which its main office is located”).
- Pannill v Roanoake, 252 F. 910 D.C.VA. (1918) – “domicile and citizenship are not always synonymous”.
- Choice of
“domicile” is a strictly political and not legal matter. It is a matter of our political choice and affiliation. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that no government may dictate our choice of political affiliations, as revealed in the American Jurisprudence Legal Encyclopedia:
“The right to associate or not to associate with others solely on the basis of individual choice, not being absolute,4 may conflict with a societal interest in requiring one to associate with others, or to prohibit one from associating with others, in order to accomplish what the state deems to be the common good. The Supreme Court, though rarely called upon to
examine this aspect of the right to freedom of association, has never the less established certain basic rules which will cover many situations involving forced or prohibited associations. Thus, where a sufficiently compelling state interest, outside the political spectrum, can be accomplished only by requiring individuals to associate together for the common good, then such forced association is constitutional.5 But the Supreme Court has made it clear that compelling an individual to become a member of an organization with political aspects, or compelling an individual to become a member of an organization which financially supports, in
more than an insignificant way, political personages or goals which the individual does not wish to support, is an infringement of the individual's constitutional right to freedom of association.6 The First Amendment prevents the
government, except in the most compelling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its employees' freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not associate; it is not merely at tenure provision that protects public employees from actual or constructive discharge.7 Thus, First Amendment principles prohibit a state from compelling any individual to associate with a political party, as a condition of retaining public employment.8 The First Amendment protects non-policymaking public employees from discrimination based on their political beliefs or affiliation.9 But the First Amendment protects the right of
political party members to advocate that a specific person be elected or appointed to a particular office and that a specific person be hired to perform a governmental function.10 In the First Amendment context, the political
patronage exception to the First Amendment protection for public employees is to be construed broadly, so as presumptively to encompass positions placed by legislature outside of “merit” civil service. Positions specifically named in relevant federal, state, county, or municipal laws to which discretionary authority with respect to enforcement of that law or carrying out of some other policy of political concern is granted, such as a secretary of state given statutory authority over various
state corporation law practices, fall within the political patronage exception to First Amendment protection of public employees.11
1 But it has long been settled that residence and citizenship were wholly different things within the meaning of the Constitution and the laws defining and regulating the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States;…. a mere averment of residence in a particular state is not an averment of citizenship in that state for the purposes
of jurisdiction.
2 Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 137, 15 L. ed. 318; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 24 L. ed. 1057; Everhart v. Huntsville Female College, 120 U.S. 223 , 30 L. ed.
623, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555; Timmons v. Elyton Land Co. 139 U.S. 378 , 35 L. ed. 195, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585; Denny v. Pironi, 141 U.S. 121, 123 , 35 S. L. ed. 657, 658, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966; Wolfe v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. co. 148 U.S. 389 , 37 L. ed. 493, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 602.
3 Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 137; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646; Everhart v. Huntsville College, 120 U.S. 223; Menard v. Goggan, 121 U.S. 253; and in case of a defective averment in this particular the judgment will be reversed by this court upon its own motion, and the case remanded; Peper v. Fordyce, 119 U.S. 469; Everhart v. Huntsville College, 120 U.S. 223; Menard v. Goggan, 121 U.S.
253. A case cannot be amended here so as to show jurisdiction, but the court below, in its discretion, may allow it to be done where the suit was instituted in the Circuit Court; Continental Insurance Company v. Rhoads, 119 U.S. 237; Halsted v. Buster, 119 U.S. 341.
4 §539
5 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 81 S.Ct. 1826, 6 L.Ed.2d. 1191
(1961), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871, 82 S.Ct. 23, 7 L.Ed.2d. 72 (1961) (a state supreme court may order integration of the state bar); Railway Emp. Dept.v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112 (1956), motion denied, 351 U.S. 979, 76 S.Ct. 1044, 100 L.Ed. 1494 (1956) and reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 859, 77 S.Ct. 22, 1 L.Ed.2d. 69 (1956) (upholding the validity of the union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act).The First Amendment right to freedom of association of teachers was not
violated by enforcement of a rule that white teachers whose children did not attend public schools would not be rehired. Cook v. Hudson, 511 F.2d. 744, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 10134 (5th Cir. 1975), reh'g denied, 515 F.2d. 762 (5th Cir. 1975) and cert. granted, 424 U.S. 941, 96 S.Ct. 1408, 47 L.Ed.2d. 347 (1976) and cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 165, 97 S.Ct. 543, 50 L.Ed.2d. 373, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 11246 (1976).Annotation: Supreme Court's views regarding Federal Constitution's First
Amendment right of association as applied to elections and other political activities, 116 L.Ed.2d. 997, §10.
6 Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729,
111 L.Ed.2d. 52,5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 673(1990), reh'gdenied, 497 U.S. 1050,111 S.Ct. 13,111L.Ed.2d. 828(1990) and reh'gdenied, 497 U.S. 1050,111S.Ct. 13,111L.Ed.2d. 828 (1990) (conditioning public employment hiring decisions on political belief and association violates the First Amendment rights of applicants in the absence of some vital governmental interest)
7 Rutanv. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d. 52, 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 673 (1990), reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050, 111 S.Ct. 13, 111 L.Ed.2d. 828 (1990) and reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050, 111 S.Ct. 13, 111 L.Ed.2d. 828 (1990).Annotation: Public employee's right of free speech
under Federal Constitution's First Amendment–Supreme Court cases, 97 L.Ed.2d. 903.First Amendment protection for law enforcement employees subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 109 A.L.R. Fed. 9.First Amendment protection for judges or government attorneys subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 108 A.L.R. Fed. 117.First Amendment protection for public hospital or health employees subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of
speech, 107 A.L.R. Fed. 21.First Amendment protection for publicly employed firefighters subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 106 A.L.R. Fed. 396
8
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d. 261, 95L.R.R.M. (BNA)2411,81Lab. Cas. (CCH)¶55041(1977),reh'gdenied,433U.S. 915,97S.Ct. 2989,53L.Ed.2d. 1102(1977);Parrish v. Nikolits,86F.3d. 1088 (11thCir. 1996),cert. denied,117S.Ct. 1818,137L.Ed.2d. 1027(U.S. 1997).
9 LaRou v. Ridlon,98F.3d. 659(1stCir. 1996); Parrish v. Nikolits,86F.3d. 1088(11thCir. 1996),cert. denied,117S.Ct. 1818,137L.Ed.2d. 1027(U.S. 1997).
10 Vickery v. Jones, 100 F.3d. 1334 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1553, 137 L.Ed.2d. 701 (U.S. 1997). Responsibilities of the position of director of a municipality's office of federal programs resembled those of a policy maker, privy to confidential information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose function was such
that party affiliation was an equally important requirement for continued tenure. Ortiz-Pinerov. Rivera-Arroyo, 84 F.3d. 7 (1st Cir. 1996).
11 McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d. 1536, 12 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1833, 1996 Fed.App. 335P (6th Cir. 1996), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, (Feb. 13, 1997). Law Reviews: Stokes, When Freedoms Conflict: Party Discipline and the First Amendment. 11 JL &Pol 751, Fall, 1995.Pave, Public Employees and the First Amendment Petition Clause: Protecting the Rights of Citizen-Employees Who File Legitimate Grievances and
Lawsuits Against Their Government Employers. 90 NW U LR 304, Fall, 1995.Singer, Conduct and Belief: Public Employees' First Amendment Rights to Free Expression and Political Affiliation. 59 U Chi LR 897, Spring, 1992.As to political patronage jobs, see §472.
