By the Supreme Court’s October Term of 1998 my clients had petitioned five times, two of whom made it past the clerks to the Justices before being denied. I am 5 for 6 against the Oregon State Attorney General in civil cases. In 2005, in US District Court - Austin, TX, Ass’t US Attorney Stephen Bass asked for and received a “protective order” to keep from having to indulge my primary arguments against income taxation as the IRS advises.
That protective order was Exhibit #1 behind my Jan. 2006 complaint to eighty members of Congress, to which I’ve never received so much as an acknowledgement or reply of any nature. In 2007 a criminal defense attorney I had tutored asked a twenty year IRS Officer, “How did § 83 operate in your determination that Mr. Gebauer owed an income tax on his compensation?” The IRS Officer, Sue Besson, replied, “I am unfamiliar with § 83.”
Montelepre Systemed, Inc. v. C.I.R., 956 F.2d 496, 498 at [1] (CA5 1992): “Section 83(a) explains how property received in exchange for services is taxed.”
Gudmundsson v. US, 634 F.3d 212 (CA2 2011): “At the heart of this case is I.R.C. § 83, which governs the taxation of property transferred
in connection with the performance of services.”
Robinson v. C.I.R., 82 USTC 444, 459 (1984); The legislative history of section 83 does not require the conclusion that the statute should be applied to tax-avoidance techniques only. To the contrary, the House and Senate reports specifically delineate transactions and transfers to which section 83 was not to apply and do not exclude
from its purview contractual provisions that were not tax motivated.”
Cohn v. C.I.R., 73 USTC (Tax Court) 443, 446 (1979): “Petitioners rest their entire case on the proposition that Elovich and Cohn and/or Mega were “independent contractors” and not employees of the Integrated and that, therefore, section 83 does not apply to the acquisition of the shares from Integrated. They rely on
the legislative history surrounding the statute to support their proposition that section 83 was intended to apply only to restricted stock transferred to employees. Respondent contends that the words “any person” in section 83(a) encompass independent contractors as well as employees. We agree with Respondent. . . . We reject petitioner’s argument. While restricted stock plans involving employers and employees may have been the primary impetus behind the enactment of
section 83, the language of the section covers the transfer of any property transferred in connection with the performance of services “to any person other than the person for whom the services are performed.” (Emphasis added.) The legislative history makes clear that Congress was aware that the statute’s coverage extended beyond restricted stock plans for employees. H.Rept. 91-413 (Part 1) (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 200, 255; S.Rept. 91-552 (1969),
1969-3 C.B. 423, 501. The regulations state that that section 83 applies to employees and independent contractors (sec. 1.83-1(a), Income Tax Regs.). There is no question but that, under the foregoing circumstances, these regulations are not “unreasonably and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes.” Consequently, they are sustained. (cites omitted)”
MacNaughton v. C.I.R., 888 F.2d 418, 421 (CA6 1989): “The Alves court stated that the plain language of section 83 belied this argument because the “statute applied to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services” and because no reference is made to the term “compensation.” Id. The court further concluded in Alves that “if Congress had intended section 83(a) to apply solely to restricted stock used to
compensate employees, it could have used much narrower language.” Id. at 481-82. Upon consideration, we agree with the interpretation advanced by the Alves court and, therefore, join the Ninth Circuit in holding that section 83 is not limited to stock transfers which are compensatory in nature.”
Pledger v. C.I.R., 641 F.2d 287, 293 (CA5 1981): “The taxing scheme
imposed by Congress more accurately reflects what taxpayer received as compensation than a scheme that taxes the taxpayer on merely a portion of the compensation.”
Alves v. C.I.R., 734 F.2d 478, 481 (CA9 1984): “The plain language of section 83(a) belies Alve’s argument. Section 83(a) applies to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services. No
reference is made to the term “compensation.” Nor is there any statutory requirement that property have a fair market value in excess of the amount paid at the time of transfer. Indeed, if Congress had intended section 83(a) to apply solely to restricted stock used to compensate its employees, it could have used much narrower language. Indeed, Congress made section 83(a) applicable to all restricted “property,” not just stock; to property transferred to “any person,” not
just to employees; and to property transferred “in connection with . . . services,” not just compensation for employment. See Cohn v. Commissioner, 73 USTC 443, 446-47 (1979).” [1]
Concurring with Cohn, Alves, see Centel Communications Co. v. CIR, 920 F.2d 1335, 1342 (CA7 1990).
Klingler Electric Co. v. C.I.R., 776 F.Supp. 1158, 1164 at [1] (S.D.Miss. 1991): “Section 83(a) applies to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services.”
An IRS Officer of twenty years is “unfamiliar with § 83” which determines whether or not somebody who received compensation even owes a tax to begin with? Really? She was lying. These
circuit courts (US Courts of Appeals) and US Tax Court say it’s the controlling statute, I’ve began hammering on the IRS with it in 1993 five times to the Supreme Court, and an Officer of twenty years is “unfamiliar” with it? Nobody has an option but to consider the statute and to comply with it, and my manual explains my conclusion about statutory language that has the IRS lying about its considerations.
[1] That’s the
9th Circuit citing US Tax Court in Cohn v. Comm’r, 73 USTC 443 (1979)."
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